


Prof. David Heymann, Chatham House, United Kingdom



PANDEMIC
PREPAREDNESS
WHERE SCIENCE
AND POLICY MEET

International Health Regulations: making them work better


Infectious disease concerns over the centuries



Concern about public health security: plague, cholera, yellow fever and smallpox

1374

1851 - 1902



nip Quarantine for lague only


International anitary Conferences

Concern about public health security: plague, cholera, yellow fever and smallpox

1374	Venice	Ship Quarantine for Plague only
1851 - 1902	Europe/Americas	10 International Sanitary Conferences
1920	Geneva	League of Nations Health Organization
1951	Geneva	International Sanitary Regulations
1969 and 2005	Geneva	International Health Regulations

International Health Regulations: objective

"Maximum security against the international spread of infectious diseases with minimal interruption of travel and trade"




International Health Regulations 1969: requirements


- Notification to WHO: cholera, plague, yellow fever or smallpox – reports only accepted from countries where event is occurring
- Health Measures: describe maximum measures that a country may require to protect against cholera, plague, smallpox and yellow fever (e.g. yellow fever vaccination card)
- Health Organization at borders: ports, airports and frontier posts adequately equipped to prevent vector proliferation




Application of International Health Regulations: reporting/prevention



Application of International Health Regulations, 1969



Economic impact, cholera and plague, 1991-1998



Breaches in species barrier: emerging infections in humans, late 20th century















Infection	Animal linked to transmission	Year infection first reported		
Ebola virus	Bats	1976		
HIV-1	Primates	1981		
E. coli O157:H7	Cattle	`1982		
Borrelia burgdorferi	Rodents	1982		
HIV-2	Primate	1986		
Hendra virus	Bats	1994		
BSE/vCJD	Cattle	1996		
Australian lyssavirus	Bats	1996		
Influenza A (H5N1)	Chickens	1997		
Nipah virus	Bats	1999		

June 2022 11 11


WHO: vision for revision of the International Health Regulations, 1996

- A world on the alert and able to detect and respond to international infectious disease threats within 24 hours using the most up to date means of global communication and collaboration
- A change in the norms surrounding reporting of infectious disease outbreaks, making it expected and respected to report

Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network




SARS: international spread from Hong Kong, 21 February – 12 March, 2003



Source: WHO/CDC

WHO real time guidelines, SARS, 2003: www.who.int/csr/sars/



Update 79 - Situation in China

China's Executive Vice Minister of Health, Mr Gao Qiang, and WHO's Executive Director for Communicable Diseases briefed the press this morning on the situation of SARS control in China. Also in attendance were Dr Qi Ziaoqiu, Director-General of the

Cumulative Number of Reported Probable Cases Of SARS

From: 1 Nov 2002¹ To: 2 June 2003, 18:00 GMT+2

Revised: 3 June 2003, 9.00 GMT +2


Country Cumulative number of case(s)² Number of new cases

Brazil 2 0 0 2 10/Apr/2003 24/Apr/2003 Canada 198 10 30 116 1/Jun/2003 1/Jun/2003 China 5338 2 334 3495 1/Jun/2003 2/Jun/2003

SARS Travel Recommendations Summary Table


This table, updated daily, indicates those areas with recent local transmission of SARS for which WHO has issued recommendations pertaining to international travel.

Probable cases of SARS by date of onset worldwide, 1 March – 27 June 2003



^{*}This graph does not include 2,527 probable cases of SARS (2,521 from Beijing, China), for whom no dates of onset are currently available.

New norms for reporting and responding to infectious diseases, 2003




Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)

All infectious diseases with potential for international spread to be reported

Reporting of infectious diseases from other sources accepted by WHO Member States

Revised International Health Regulations to serve as a formal framework for pro-active international surveillance and response through national IHR focal points

International Health Regulations 2005




From three diseases to all public health threats

From passive to pro-active using real time surveillance/evidence

From control at borders to detection and containment at source

Requirements, International Health Regulations



- Strengthened national core capacity for surveillance and control
- Mandatory reporting of possible public health emergency of international importance (PHEIC)
- Emergency Committee to advise DG
- Global response

Core capacities in public health - example


Core Capacities MEASURE OF COMPLIANCE		Stage of Implementation (Justify answer and tick one only) Full Partial None		Describe stage of implementation of capacities and/or action to be taken (e.g. progress, gaps and plan for capacity development, including resource and timelines, etc.) To be filled in by competent authority of Member State or person responsible for point of entry self assessment		
(a) To provide appropriate public health emergency response by establishing and maintaining a Public Health Emergency Contingency Plan, including the nomination of a coordinator and contact points for relevant point of entry, public health and other agencies and services						
1. Public health emergency contingency plan An agreed, updated, documented public health emergency contingency plan, integrated with other public health response plans (national/intermediate/local levels) and other emergency operational plans at point of entry, covering relevant services at point of entry and disseminated to all key stakeholders.						
2. Integration with other response plans A clearly structured allocation of functions within the public health emergency contingency plan, for all services and sectors involved at point of entry to carry out policy /guidance, coordination, management and evaluation functions during a public health response: coordinator/committee identified sub-sector/services contacts and plans in place sub-sector/service contact points identified contact points for key sectors/services at point of entry identified/nominated and details shared with competent authority integration with possible sectoral plans contact points of key sectors/services at point of entry including public health, immigration, transportation, security, public information/media identification of mechanism/system in operation and procedures in place for communication/collaboration between public health authorities, within national health surveillance system, with regard to reporting, information exchange, assessment and coordinated response, in coordination with national, intermediate and local public health alert and response plans a reliable system for informing the local competent authority in charge to implement health measures of the pending arrival of a suspected case of a communicable disease, when traffic control or other authorities at point of entry have been notified of this by conveyances operators.						
3. Training and/or drill exercises Periodic training and/or drill exercises to familiarize contact points of key sectors/services at point of entry with the public health contingency plan and respective roles and functions within it.						

GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA




Global Health Security Agenda, countries participating as of 1 January 2019

Completion of Joint External Evaluations Globally: End of 2018



Requirements, International Health Regulations



- Strengthened national core capacity for surveillance and control
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
Decision instrument International Health Regulations, possible public health emergency of internatioanl concern (PHEIC)

4 diseases that shall be always be notified polio (wild-type polio virus), smallpox, human influenza new subtype, SARS.


Diseases that shall always lead to utilization of the algorithm: cholera, pneumonic plague, yellow fever, VHF (Ebola, Lassa, Marburg), WNF, others that are unusual or unexpected and cause: serious public health impact risk of international spread

risk of travel/trade restriction

Insufficient information: reassess as evidence becomes available




Decision instrument International Health Regulations, Zika



IHR Emergency Committee, confirmation of PHEIC



Decision making and response and the revised International Health Regulations 2005



COVID-19 and the International Health Regulations 2005: Emergency Committee Recommendations

- 1) Share best practices with WHO; apply lessons learned from countries
- 2) Support multilateral regional and global organizations and encourage global solidarity in COVID-19 response.
- 3) Enhance and sustain political commitment and leadership for national strategies and localized response activities driven by science, data, and experience; engage all sectors in addressing the impacts of the pandemic.
- 4) Continue to enhance capacity for public health surveillance, testing, and contact tracing.
- 5) Share timely information and data with WHO on COVID-19 epidemiology
- 6) Strengthen community engagement, empower individuals, and build trust by addressing mis/disinformation a
- 7) Engage in the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, participate in relevant trials
- 8) Implement, regularly update, and share information with WHO on appropriate and proportionate travel measures and advice, based on risk assessments; implement necessary capacities, including at points of entry, to mitigate the potential risks of international transmission of COVID-19 and to facilitate international contact tracing.
- 9) Maintain essential health services disasters.

 <u>Statement on the fourth meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the outbreak of coronavirus</u>

IHR – some lessons learned from COVID-19

- WHO member countries decided to adopt travel recommendations based on the risk assessment of national advisory groups: non-collaborative, chaotic international travel contrary to the WHO Director General's blanket recommendation to not adopt barriers to international travel as initially recommended by the WHO
- Previous major 21st century public health events such as the SARS-CoV-1 outbreak in 2003 and the Influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in 2009: WHO accepted as the major source of information and guidance.
- Abundance of scientific evidence on COVID-19 available the internet
 - peer-reviewed publications in front of the medical journal paywall,
 - pre peer-reviewed manuscripts,
 - rapid communication through regional surveillance and other collaborative networks such as Africa CDC, ASEAN and IANPHI.

IHR - vision for the future

Are the functions and scope of the IHR fit for pandemic preparedness

- do they clearly define data sharing:
- do they provide for sharing of benefits of public health innovations
- do they take advantage of the support that can be provided by the private sector

Is there a need for a standard methodology to assess the risks and benefits of closing international borders to traffic with the objective of delaying virus introduction

Will a pandemic treaty compensate for the weakness of the IHR, or will there be another revision?